ABSTRACTS
Carlos Barbosa Cepeda, ‘Making sense of Nāgārjuna’s ineffabilism—and ineffabilism in general’
I will argue that an inquiry into how Nāgārjuna can deal with the paradoxical nature of his ineffabilism may shed light on the problem of how to make sense of ineffabilism in general. It is possible to do so by means of identifying: (i) the specific character of his “refutation” of all conventional truth; (ii) how he establishes the distinction between the sayable and the unsayable in terms of conventional vs. ultimate truth; (iii) the variety of linguistic devices (figurative and negative) that he uses along with the sayable/unsayable distinction to suggest the possibility of a trans-conceptual understanding of reality; (iv) how such understanding is embodied only through a form of praxis. Let us explain these points in further detail.
Nāgārjuna’s disturbing refutation of all viewpoints, which turns all truths expressible in language into conventional truth (saṃvṛti satya), can be interpreted as a radical critique of characterization, i.e., the basic operation of cognition that enables understanding reality in terms of distinctions. However, if all distinctions are conventional—hence not the ultimate truth—, how can the ultimate truth (paramārtha satya) be achieved? In order to address this question, it is important to analyse the varieties of linguistic resources that enable him to point to a transconceptual—more fundamentally, transcategorial—understanding of reality. These devices can be classified into two types: (a) metaphorical; (b) negative (direct negation and contradiction). These two types of strategies combined help to understand that Nāgārjuna does not merely negate all truth—rather, he suggests a mode of truth that transcends categorisation but at the same time is not radically different from it, nor is it disconnected from concrete reality. Following that line, such transcategorial truth is not found in a place absolutely transcendent to our own experience, but at the very root of our life and experience: it is always there as the root of all possible forms of categorisation. Its realisation, therefore, requires a form of praxis able to disclose it to our awareness.
As I will try to argue, this analysis discloses that Nāgārjuna’s “refutation” of all conventional truth does not mean that language becomes disconnected from truth. It is connected to truth, yet not as a vehicle thereof, but as a type of instruments (upāya) to achieve its realisation. What is more, the realisation of truth must be embodied through praxis. This is the very point that helps us to make sense of ineffability in general: unsayable truth is not so because it is utterly different from sayable truth, but rather because it is at the root of every possible experience of sayable truth.
Lea Cantor, 'Zhuangzi’s words argument against monism'
Despite occurring in one of the most heavily discussed chapters of the Zhuangzi – Qi wu lun 齊物論 or “The Equalizing Assessment of Things” – Zhuangzi’s words argument against monism, centring on the problem of speaking about the one thing there is, has so far received relatively little attention. A.C. Graham has observed in passing that the argument is similar to Plato’s names argument against Parmenidean monism in the Sophist, though he does not spell out the connection. In this paper, I draw on insights from the literature addressing Plato’s names argument to shed light on the mechanisms of its Zhuangzian counterpart and on its discussion in Guo Xiang’s commentary. The dialogical perspective with Plato brings into focus the fact that Zhuangzi’s argument against monism – which I call the words argument – does not presuppose just any kind of monism. It specifically presupposes numerical monism – that is, the view that there is only one thing. I further argue that Zhuangzi’s words argument has significant bite not just as a challenge to more stringent versions of numerical monism à la Parmenides, which rule out the existence of parts, but also as a challenge to what I call ‘generous numerical monism’, whereby the one thing there is admits of parts. Zhuangzi’s words argument, I suggest, successfully targets a wider range of numerical monist positions than does its Platonic counterpart.
Amit Chaturvedi, ‘“How is reality both ineffable and “nothing but name”? Early Yogācāra sources on the linguistic construction and inexpressibility of mind and world’
Early Yogācāra texts employ a range of arguments to defend the seemingly idealist thesis that all things are “nothing but mind” (cittamātra). Yet, this thesis is actually held only provisionally, to be in some sense abandoned at a higher stage of philosophical and meditative analysis. What these texts really defend is the non-duality of ultimate reality, which entails the ultimate unreality or emptiness of both mind-independent objects as well as subjective mental states. This paper focuses on a similar dynamic in early Yogācāra texts concerning their seemingly linguistic idealist thesis that all things are also “nothing but name” (nāmamātra). Though objects may appear to exist outside of our awareness and apart from our names for them, early Yogācāra thinkers like Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati claim that these apparent objects in fact merely exist as conceptual/linguistic constructions. I reconstruct their reasons for why names cannot genuinely refer to an extralinguistic reality, and hence why the concepts of signifier and signified are ultimately empty. I further examine how the emptiness of linguistic designations is established in parallel with arguments for the claim that mental states cannot genuinely represent an extramental reality. I then locate in early Yogācāra texts an explanation for how the dualistic illusions of subject/object and signifier/signified, as well as our suffering-inducing attachments to those illusions, jointly originate from a common source – namely, the subliminal activity of “discursive attention” or inner speech (jalpamanaskāra). All objective and subjective entities, including the fundamental aggregates of traditional Buddhist ontology, are said to be conceptual fictions fabricated by the cognitive/linguistic activity of discursive attention. The causal account of discursive attention additionally offers some insightful suggestions about the phenomenology of how mental discourse generates the illusions of mental intentionality and linguistic referentiality. All that said, early Yogācāra texts also aim to foster the liberatory non-conceptual gnosis of a reality that is inexpressible and unthinkable, one which transcends even the philosophical notions of “mind-only” and “name-only.” I suggest that by foregrounding discursive mental activity as the causal basis of subjective conceptualization, intersubjective conventional reality, and the existential delusions found therein, we can better correlate the projects of Yogācāra philosophy and soteriology, and reframe the role that a direct vision of ineffable reality is supposed to serve within those projects. That is, we can understand how ontological and linguistic idealisms, as well as twin forms of metaphysical and meditative silence, are all progressive factors in the culmination of the Yogācāra path.
Nilanjan Das, ‘Jayanta Bhaṭṭa on Non-Conceptual Content’
In the second chapter of The Raceme of Reasoning (Nyāyamañjarī), the Nyāya epistemologist Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (c. 870 CE) takes up the question of what distinguishes states of awareness (jñāna) that are non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) from those that are conceptual (savikalpaka). Jayanta discusses this distinction in two contexts: in the context of explaining why states of perceptual knowledge are described in the Nyāyasūtra as “inexpressible” (avyapadeśya), and in the context of arguing against the Buddhist view that all states of perceptual awareness are non-conceptual.
Typically, Nyāya epistemologists argue that perception—understood as a source of knowledge (pramāṇa)—can not only give rise to states of non-conceptual awareness but also to states of conceptual awareness. This position is incompatible with two other views. The first of these is the view of the Sanskrit grammarians, like Bhartṛhari, who claim that all states of awareness are conceptual because all of them categorize objects using linguistic expressions (belonging to a language of thought). The second of these is the view of Buddhist epistemologists like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti who claim that all states of perceptual awareness are non-conceptual, because they are directed at real, spatiotemporally unextended particulars alone (while states of conceptual awareness are directed at general characteristics). These two views embody two ways of distinguishing states of non-conceptual awareness from states of conceptual awareness: the grammarians appeal to the features of the representations involved in states of conceptual awareness, while the Buddhists appeal to the differences between the intentional objects of the two kinds of awareness.
I will show how Jayanta rejects both these views. For Jayanta, the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual awareness cannot be accounted for by appealing to either the differences between the kinds of representations that they involve, or to the differences between their intentional objects. Rather, the difference between the two kinds of awareness is based on two distinctive features of conceptual awareness: the predicative structure of their contents, and the role that memory plays in generating this kind of predicative content. I go on to explain how Jayanta’s account of non-conceptual content helps us preserve the idea that some states of perceptual awareness are non-conceptual, while explaining how they can serve as an epistemic foundation for other states of conceptual awareness.
Monica Ding, ‘Regularity (cháng 常) in Xunzi: What is beyond the regularity is beyond words’
Xunzi emphasizes on a strictly unified system of language where names are fixed to distinguish different kinds of objects (22/7). Xunzi seems to make a rather contradictory claim. On the one hand, the sage king classifies rankings and roles of people, together with kinds of the myriad of things and their social uses into a unified system of kinds (tǒng lèi 統類), also known as the patterned system (lǐ 理). Xunzi is confident that, via this system, everything in the world can be discussed, distinguished, and organized. The sage who achieves understanding of this unified system of kinds is capable of patterning the myriad things and all their changes with no doubts (12/28), to a degree that all the myriad things can be seen, distinguished and arranged into proper positions’ (21/41).
On the other hand, Xunzi admits the limitation of this unified system of kinds. Xunzi argues that we can never know all the patterns of things and their changes, and thus the learner should only learn the regulations and ranking of things following the sage king’s teaching (21/80). For Xunzi, we know things, say things, and take actions following the unified system of kinds and their names, while for things outside of this system, silence is better than words (5/56).
There are two questions: (1) why should we only consider things inside of this unified system and be confident that any unexpected change can be recognized and responded to? At the same time, why are things outside of this system impossible and unnecessary to be talked about?
It is widely accepted Xunzi supports a social constructivist account of dao. Dao, including the unified system of kinds and their names, is socially constructed. In this talk, I will first suggest a novel explanation of Xunzi’s social constructivism. I will argue that Xunzi’s social constructivism is grounded in a notion of regularity (cháng 常). Xunzi believes that both human society and natural world are changing with a certain regularity. As the sun rises in the east every day, social roles and structure, such as the relations between father and son also happen and repeat regularly. The unified system of kinds and names is a linguistic and social embodiment of this regularity. Inside of this regularity, as long as we say words and take actions following the unified system of kinds, we can achieve order together with the Heaven and the earth. However, things outside of this regularity are also outside of the scope of language and also should not be considered. Xunzi shows no worry about this limitation. One possible explanation is that he believes that talking about things outside of the system would break down the regularity, and thus is unnecessary, if not dangerous.
In this talk, I will show that the notion of regularity is an indispensable part of Xunzi’s social constructivist account of language. I will further discuss why Xunzi believes that things outside of this regularity are beyond words and should not be considered.
Chris Fraser, 'Effable and Ineffable in Early Chinese Discourse on Dào'
A basic implication of the hermeneutic circle is that our understanding of claims about ineffability in some discourse must be predicated on an understanding of claims about effability. To interpret assertions we find in the Zhuāngzǐ that, for instance, “dào cannot be spoken” (道不可言, 22/62), we need to first grasp the significance of the claim that dào can be spoken. In this talk, I’ll first sketch some widely shared views in pre-Hàn thought according to which speech can indeed guide us in following dào, understood as the apt way or path of life or the concrete performance of such a way. I’ll then examine a series of pericopes from the Zhuāngzǐ that reject these views and present various reasons why dào cannot be articulated in speech. Finally, I’ll consider Daoist explanations of how, despite the supposed ineffability of dào, it is still possible to talk about it. What we will find is that, against the backdrop of prevailing pre-Hàn explanations of the functioning of “names” (míng 名) and “speech” (yán 言), apparently paradoxical formulations such as “an unspoken teaching” (不言之教) or “speech that doesn’t speak” (不言之言) are in fact readily intelligible.
Anna Lucia Furlan, ‘Shall I utter the unutterable? Unveiling the Mysteries in Julian’s Hymn to the Mother of the Gods’
At the start of his Hymn to the Mother of the Gods –the fifth Oration composed in the spring of 362 CE– Julian asks himself: ‘shall I write about things not to be spoken of (ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρρήτων γράψομεν) and divulge what ought not to be divulged? Shall I utter the unutterable (τὰ ἀνεκλάλητα ἐκλαλήσομεν)?’ (Or. 5, 159a). The emperor, philosopher and priest wonders if he should reveal who Attis and the Mother of the Gods are, along with the origins and nature of the rituals associated with them. Throughout the oration, which includes a complex allegorical interpretation of the Attis myth, Julian feels compelled to speak of the sacred rites while at the same time acknowledging that they should not – and to some extent cannot – be revealed to everyone. The emperor (re)interprets rites, symbols and myths associated with Cybele and Attis within the framework of a multi-layered theology inspired by (Neo)platonism and close to henotheistic expressions, in an overall revival, justification and strenuous defence of traditional religion (cf. Smith 1995, De Vita 2010, Liebeschuetz 2012, Nesselrath 2020).
The contribution aims at investigating the presence in Julian’s Oration 5 of features connected with forms of ‘mysteriosophy’ encompassing both a doctrinal and a ritual side, pointing to the union of some kind of secret knowledge (sophia) on the nature of the divine, the cosmos and the destiny of the soul with religious practice (cf. Bianchi 1976, Sfameni Gasparro 1981). This paper will explore the tension between Julian’s preoccupation and reasons behind his wish to unveil the hidden meaning of the Mysteries and the mystic precept not to reveal the sophia to the uninitiated. It will be argued that this tension lies at the heart of Julian’s oration and is best portrayed precisely through the use of terms and images echoing forms of mysteriosophy which are therefore mentioned both because of the language associated with them and the wisdom they convey.
The influence of the thought and work of Porphyry of Tyre will also be observed, especially in the allegorical exegesis of symbols and enigmas linked with the destiny of souls and the nature of the divine. Porphyry himself had, indeed, notably warned his readers to conceal his words as the most unutterable of secrets (ἀρρήτων ἀρρητότερα in Eus. Praep. Ev. 4.8.2 = Porph. Phil. Orac. fr. 305F Smith.) and explained how hard it is to reveal the secret meaning of the Mysteries (ἃ δὴ πάντα ἀνιχνεῦσαι καὶ ἀναπτύξαι in Porph. Antr. 4). In this paper an attempt will thus be made to investigate a specific case study – Julian’s Oration 5 – to cast light on forms of ineffability in Late Antiquity. The scope of the analysis falls within the study of Julian’s philosophical inquiry but also within the broader discussion of different forms of late antique philosophical religion, providing insights into Julian’s thought, personality and action as well as underscoring the complex but fruitful relationship between theology, philosophy and the Mysteries.
Parimal Patil, ‘Dharmakīrti, Ineffability, and Causal Relations’
Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti (c. 550-650CE) adopt an ineffability attitude which has epistemological, ontological, and semantic dimensions. By taking Dharmakīrti's views of causal relations as a model, this paper explores his arguments on the limits of (1) the ontological stance we can take to such relations, (2) our knowledge of them, and (3) our talk of them. The paper concludes with a discussion of the significance of this attitude for Dharmakīrti's meta-philosophical views.
Shaul Tor, ‘Pyrrhonian scepticism as an ineffable knack'
Any account articulating what Pyrrhonian scepticism is will rest on three conceptual pillars: (i) a subject (who is appeared to with appearances of external objects); (ii) appearances (of external objects and appearing to a subject), and (iii) external objects (correlated with appearances appearing to a subject). In this talk, I argue that Sextus subjects at least (i) and (ii) to sceptical scrutiny in a way that makes it problematic for the Pyrrhonist to help themselves to those conceptual pillars, and to any particular understanding of them, in the course of expressing an account of Pyrrhonian scepticism. I argue further, however, that this predicament turns out to be acceptable for the Pyrrhonist in the light of Sextus’ understanding of Pyrrhonism as a certain ‘ability’ (dynamis, PH 1.8), and of his attitude that loose and catachrestic use of language is appropriate for the purpose of accomplishing practical tasks.
Leonida Vanni, ‘Damascius’ Theory of Prime Matter’s Ineffability’
The notion of ineffability famously plays a central role in Neoplatonic philosophy. Many studies have investigated the Neoplatonists’ theories of an ineffable first principle; however, their speculations on prime matter, which is its counterpart at the bottom of reality, have received much less attention. In this paper, I explore the distinctive conception of an utterly ineffable prime matter that the philosopher Damascius (the last head of the Neoplatonic school in Athens) developed in his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. In particular, after 1) sketching the background of his reflections, 2) I elucidate his doctrine of prime matter and the rationale behind it; 3) finally, I set forth its (often problematic) theoretical implications.
1) Late Neoplatonists maintain that reality has a symmetrical structure; its lowest level (i.e. prime matter) derives from and corresponds to the highest one, so that it is “similar” to it, albeit “in a dissimilar way”. That is, they both escape all determination, but for opposite reasons: the highest entity brings about all properties and is, therefore, beyond them; prime matter takes on all properties and is below them. Most late Neoplatonists identify the first reality with the principle that they call “the one” (although, in fact, no name can adequately capture its nature). Accordingly, the traditional view has it that prime matter is an offspring of the one; in spite of its indeterminacy, then, matter does not completely lack some relation to unity.
2) But Damascius posits, beyond the one, a principle that transcends the one itself; he usually refers to it simply as “the ineffable”, although this entity is actually above the very notions of principle, transcendence, and ineffability. He is thus faced with a dilemma: he must reject either the notion of a correspondence between the highest and the lowest reality, or the traditional doctrine that matter relates to the one. Damascius ultimately abandons the latter: hence, matter is an offspring of the ineffable and is, accordingly, totally ineffable and not even one. In addition to structural reasons, Damascius’ theory of matter’s ineffability hinges on exegetical considerations, too: as I show, it is deeply rooted in his interpretation of some crucial passages of Plato’s Parmenides.
3) The idea that matter lacks any property – even unity – in much the same way as the ineffable principle surpasses them poses some problems:
a) it is difficult to understand how such an entity can be distinguished from absolute nothingness.
b) Positing that matter derives directly from the ineffable principle apparently jeopardises the latter’s absolute unrelatedness and transcendence. In this paper, I discuss these difficulties and some (possible) solutions.
By analysing these questions, I hope to shed light on what is, at the same time, an intriguing aspect of Damascius’ philosophy and a peculiar application of the notion of ineffability.
Stephen Walker, ‘“Talking all day is all about dào” - The adequacy of speech in Zhuāngzǐ 25’
Among the hundreds of distinct narratives, essays, and poetic interludes that have been compiled into our received Zhuāngzǐ, only a handful even suggest the idea that dào is somehow unspeakable, beyond the powers of language to pick out or characterize. The relevant passages, moreover, come down to us embedded in complex rhetorical performances by fictional characters (often personified abstractions), and it is hard to know whether the people who composed them were articulating a theory or doctrine of dào’s ineffability in the sense that philosophers today would be most comfortable analyzing. The most theoretically explicit Zhuangist text that examines whether dào is ineffable concludes that it is not—that thinking of it as somehow beyond our powers to articulate is a gross misstep in understanding it. An intriguing implication is that, when it came time to talk precisely and prosaically about dào, those responsible for the initial composition of the Zhuāngzǐ corpus were more ready to dismiss than to defend the claim of its ineffability.
Much of this presentation will be dedicated simply to explaining what happens in that text—a strikingly abstract (and strikingly neglected) dialogue that rounds off Zhuāngzǐ 25. The dialogue’s dominant speaker explains that “dào” is a deeply problematic but nonetheless useful word for referring to the totality of things. We need a word like “dào”, he argues, for talking about the various ways in which people can be urged to behave, about the various paths and patterns in the world that they can look for and respond to in their efforts to move. The problem is that, since the total range or field of such ways, paths, and patterns is indefinitely vast and complicated, calling it anything can prompt the mistaken impression that it has been defined or
delimited against whatever the chosen label excludes. The fact that we can verbally pair “dào” with “not dào”, taking them as jointly exhaustive of what there is, can make us fail to understand that there is nothing but dào.
Along with its fascinating assessment of “dào-talk” as a philosophical phenomenon, this dialogue presents a systematic challenge to any thinker who maintains that there is something inconceivable, unknowable, beyond all power to engage. The argument is that any such “something” can be understood in quotidian terms, as exactly like whatever other things a person is incompetent to understand, measure, count, and so on. The use of expressions like “immeasurable” or “unspeakable” helpfully informs us about the limits that speakers perceive to their own abilities, but supposing that they might properly characterize some mysterious or exalted entity amounts to a category mistake. The dialogue concludes that dào’sstrangeness as a
referent consists not in its being never referred to but in its being always referred to—provided, that is, that our speech reflects familiarity with the ways in which things relate to one another.
I will argue that an inquiry into how Nāgārjuna can deal with the paradoxical nature of his ineffabilism may shed light on the problem of how to make sense of ineffabilism in general. It is possible to do so by means of identifying: (i) the specific character of his “refutation” of all conventional truth; (ii) how he establishes the distinction between the sayable and the unsayable in terms of conventional vs. ultimate truth; (iii) the variety of linguistic devices (figurative and negative) that he uses along with the sayable/unsayable distinction to suggest the possibility of a trans-conceptual understanding of reality; (iv) how such understanding is embodied only through a form of praxis. Let us explain these points in further detail.
Nāgārjuna’s disturbing refutation of all viewpoints, which turns all truths expressible in language into conventional truth (saṃvṛti satya), can be interpreted as a radical critique of characterization, i.e., the basic operation of cognition that enables understanding reality in terms of distinctions. However, if all distinctions are conventional—hence not the ultimate truth—, how can the ultimate truth (paramārtha satya) be achieved? In order to address this question, it is important to analyse the varieties of linguistic resources that enable him to point to a transconceptual—more fundamentally, transcategorial—understanding of reality. These devices can be classified into two types: (a) metaphorical; (b) negative (direct negation and contradiction). These two types of strategies combined help to understand that Nāgārjuna does not merely negate all truth—rather, he suggests a mode of truth that transcends categorisation but at the same time is not radically different from it, nor is it disconnected from concrete reality. Following that line, such transcategorial truth is not found in a place absolutely transcendent to our own experience, but at the very root of our life and experience: it is always there as the root of all possible forms of categorisation. Its realisation, therefore, requires a form of praxis able to disclose it to our awareness.
As I will try to argue, this analysis discloses that Nāgārjuna’s “refutation” of all conventional truth does not mean that language becomes disconnected from truth. It is connected to truth, yet not as a vehicle thereof, but as a type of instruments (upāya) to achieve its realisation. What is more, the realisation of truth must be embodied through praxis. This is the very point that helps us to make sense of ineffability in general: unsayable truth is not so because it is utterly different from sayable truth, but rather because it is at the root of every possible experience of sayable truth.
Lea Cantor, 'Zhuangzi’s words argument against monism'
Despite occurring in one of the most heavily discussed chapters of the Zhuangzi – Qi wu lun 齊物論 or “The Equalizing Assessment of Things” – Zhuangzi’s words argument against monism, centring on the problem of speaking about the one thing there is, has so far received relatively little attention. A.C. Graham has observed in passing that the argument is similar to Plato’s names argument against Parmenidean monism in the Sophist, though he does not spell out the connection. In this paper, I draw on insights from the literature addressing Plato’s names argument to shed light on the mechanisms of its Zhuangzian counterpart and on its discussion in Guo Xiang’s commentary. The dialogical perspective with Plato brings into focus the fact that Zhuangzi’s argument against monism – which I call the words argument – does not presuppose just any kind of monism. It specifically presupposes numerical monism – that is, the view that there is only one thing. I further argue that Zhuangzi’s words argument has significant bite not just as a challenge to more stringent versions of numerical monism à la Parmenides, which rule out the existence of parts, but also as a challenge to what I call ‘generous numerical monism’, whereby the one thing there is admits of parts. Zhuangzi’s words argument, I suggest, successfully targets a wider range of numerical monist positions than does its Platonic counterpart.
Amit Chaturvedi, ‘“How is reality both ineffable and “nothing but name”? Early Yogācāra sources on the linguistic construction and inexpressibility of mind and world’
Early Yogācāra texts employ a range of arguments to defend the seemingly idealist thesis that all things are “nothing but mind” (cittamātra). Yet, this thesis is actually held only provisionally, to be in some sense abandoned at a higher stage of philosophical and meditative analysis. What these texts really defend is the non-duality of ultimate reality, which entails the ultimate unreality or emptiness of both mind-independent objects as well as subjective mental states. This paper focuses on a similar dynamic in early Yogācāra texts concerning their seemingly linguistic idealist thesis that all things are also “nothing but name” (nāmamātra). Though objects may appear to exist outside of our awareness and apart from our names for them, early Yogācāra thinkers like Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati claim that these apparent objects in fact merely exist as conceptual/linguistic constructions. I reconstruct their reasons for why names cannot genuinely refer to an extralinguistic reality, and hence why the concepts of signifier and signified are ultimately empty. I further examine how the emptiness of linguistic designations is established in parallel with arguments for the claim that mental states cannot genuinely represent an extramental reality. I then locate in early Yogācāra texts an explanation for how the dualistic illusions of subject/object and signifier/signified, as well as our suffering-inducing attachments to those illusions, jointly originate from a common source – namely, the subliminal activity of “discursive attention” or inner speech (jalpamanaskāra). All objective and subjective entities, including the fundamental aggregates of traditional Buddhist ontology, are said to be conceptual fictions fabricated by the cognitive/linguistic activity of discursive attention. The causal account of discursive attention additionally offers some insightful suggestions about the phenomenology of how mental discourse generates the illusions of mental intentionality and linguistic referentiality. All that said, early Yogācāra texts also aim to foster the liberatory non-conceptual gnosis of a reality that is inexpressible and unthinkable, one which transcends even the philosophical notions of “mind-only” and “name-only.” I suggest that by foregrounding discursive mental activity as the causal basis of subjective conceptualization, intersubjective conventional reality, and the existential delusions found therein, we can better correlate the projects of Yogācāra philosophy and soteriology, and reframe the role that a direct vision of ineffable reality is supposed to serve within those projects. That is, we can understand how ontological and linguistic idealisms, as well as twin forms of metaphysical and meditative silence, are all progressive factors in the culmination of the Yogācāra path.
Nilanjan Das, ‘Jayanta Bhaṭṭa on Non-Conceptual Content’
In the second chapter of The Raceme of Reasoning (Nyāyamañjarī), the Nyāya epistemologist Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (c. 870 CE) takes up the question of what distinguishes states of awareness (jñāna) that are non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) from those that are conceptual (savikalpaka). Jayanta discusses this distinction in two contexts: in the context of explaining why states of perceptual knowledge are described in the Nyāyasūtra as “inexpressible” (avyapadeśya), and in the context of arguing against the Buddhist view that all states of perceptual awareness are non-conceptual.
Typically, Nyāya epistemologists argue that perception—understood as a source of knowledge (pramāṇa)—can not only give rise to states of non-conceptual awareness but also to states of conceptual awareness. This position is incompatible with two other views. The first of these is the view of the Sanskrit grammarians, like Bhartṛhari, who claim that all states of awareness are conceptual because all of them categorize objects using linguistic expressions (belonging to a language of thought). The second of these is the view of Buddhist epistemologists like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti who claim that all states of perceptual awareness are non-conceptual, because they are directed at real, spatiotemporally unextended particulars alone (while states of conceptual awareness are directed at general characteristics). These two views embody two ways of distinguishing states of non-conceptual awareness from states of conceptual awareness: the grammarians appeal to the features of the representations involved in states of conceptual awareness, while the Buddhists appeal to the differences between the intentional objects of the two kinds of awareness.
I will show how Jayanta rejects both these views. For Jayanta, the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual awareness cannot be accounted for by appealing to either the differences between the kinds of representations that they involve, or to the differences between their intentional objects. Rather, the difference between the two kinds of awareness is based on two distinctive features of conceptual awareness: the predicative structure of their contents, and the role that memory plays in generating this kind of predicative content. I go on to explain how Jayanta’s account of non-conceptual content helps us preserve the idea that some states of perceptual awareness are non-conceptual, while explaining how they can serve as an epistemic foundation for other states of conceptual awareness.
Monica Ding, ‘Regularity (cháng 常) in Xunzi: What is beyond the regularity is beyond words’
Xunzi emphasizes on a strictly unified system of language where names are fixed to distinguish different kinds of objects (22/7). Xunzi seems to make a rather contradictory claim. On the one hand, the sage king classifies rankings and roles of people, together with kinds of the myriad of things and their social uses into a unified system of kinds (tǒng lèi 統類), also known as the patterned system (lǐ 理). Xunzi is confident that, via this system, everything in the world can be discussed, distinguished, and organized. The sage who achieves understanding of this unified system of kinds is capable of patterning the myriad things and all their changes with no doubts (12/28), to a degree that all the myriad things can be seen, distinguished and arranged into proper positions’ (21/41).
On the other hand, Xunzi admits the limitation of this unified system of kinds. Xunzi argues that we can never know all the patterns of things and their changes, and thus the learner should only learn the regulations and ranking of things following the sage king’s teaching (21/80). For Xunzi, we know things, say things, and take actions following the unified system of kinds and their names, while for things outside of this system, silence is better than words (5/56).
There are two questions: (1) why should we only consider things inside of this unified system and be confident that any unexpected change can be recognized and responded to? At the same time, why are things outside of this system impossible and unnecessary to be talked about?
It is widely accepted Xunzi supports a social constructivist account of dao. Dao, including the unified system of kinds and their names, is socially constructed. In this talk, I will first suggest a novel explanation of Xunzi’s social constructivism. I will argue that Xunzi’s social constructivism is grounded in a notion of regularity (cháng 常). Xunzi believes that both human society and natural world are changing with a certain regularity. As the sun rises in the east every day, social roles and structure, such as the relations between father and son also happen and repeat regularly. The unified system of kinds and names is a linguistic and social embodiment of this regularity. Inside of this regularity, as long as we say words and take actions following the unified system of kinds, we can achieve order together with the Heaven and the earth. However, things outside of this regularity are also outside of the scope of language and also should not be considered. Xunzi shows no worry about this limitation. One possible explanation is that he believes that talking about things outside of the system would break down the regularity, and thus is unnecessary, if not dangerous.
In this talk, I will show that the notion of regularity is an indispensable part of Xunzi’s social constructivist account of language. I will further discuss why Xunzi believes that things outside of this regularity are beyond words and should not be considered.
Chris Fraser, 'Effable and Ineffable in Early Chinese Discourse on Dào'
A basic implication of the hermeneutic circle is that our understanding of claims about ineffability in some discourse must be predicated on an understanding of claims about effability. To interpret assertions we find in the Zhuāngzǐ that, for instance, “dào cannot be spoken” (道不可言, 22/62), we need to first grasp the significance of the claim that dào can be spoken. In this talk, I’ll first sketch some widely shared views in pre-Hàn thought according to which speech can indeed guide us in following dào, understood as the apt way or path of life or the concrete performance of such a way. I’ll then examine a series of pericopes from the Zhuāngzǐ that reject these views and present various reasons why dào cannot be articulated in speech. Finally, I’ll consider Daoist explanations of how, despite the supposed ineffability of dào, it is still possible to talk about it. What we will find is that, against the backdrop of prevailing pre-Hàn explanations of the functioning of “names” (míng 名) and “speech” (yán 言), apparently paradoxical formulations such as “an unspoken teaching” (不言之教) or “speech that doesn’t speak” (不言之言) are in fact readily intelligible.
Anna Lucia Furlan, ‘Shall I utter the unutterable? Unveiling the Mysteries in Julian’s Hymn to the Mother of the Gods’
At the start of his Hymn to the Mother of the Gods –the fifth Oration composed in the spring of 362 CE– Julian asks himself: ‘shall I write about things not to be spoken of (ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρρήτων γράψομεν) and divulge what ought not to be divulged? Shall I utter the unutterable (τὰ ἀνεκλάλητα ἐκλαλήσομεν)?’ (Or. 5, 159a). The emperor, philosopher and priest wonders if he should reveal who Attis and the Mother of the Gods are, along with the origins and nature of the rituals associated with them. Throughout the oration, which includes a complex allegorical interpretation of the Attis myth, Julian feels compelled to speak of the sacred rites while at the same time acknowledging that they should not – and to some extent cannot – be revealed to everyone. The emperor (re)interprets rites, symbols and myths associated with Cybele and Attis within the framework of a multi-layered theology inspired by (Neo)platonism and close to henotheistic expressions, in an overall revival, justification and strenuous defence of traditional religion (cf. Smith 1995, De Vita 2010, Liebeschuetz 2012, Nesselrath 2020).
The contribution aims at investigating the presence in Julian’s Oration 5 of features connected with forms of ‘mysteriosophy’ encompassing both a doctrinal and a ritual side, pointing to the union of some kind of secret knowledge (sophia) on the nature of the divine, the cosmos and the destiny of the soul with religious practice (cf. Bianchi 1976, Sfameni Gasparro 1981). This paper will explore the tension between Julian’s preoccupation and reasons behind his wish to unveil the hidden meaning of the Mysteries and the mystic precept not to reveal the sophia to the uninitiated. It will be argued that this tension lies at the heart of Julian’s oration and is best portrayed precisely through the use of terms and images echoing forms of mysteriosophy which are therefore mentioned both because of the language associated with them and the wisdom they convey.
The influence of the thought and work of Porphyry of Tyre will also be observed, especially in the allegorical exegesis of symbols and enigmas linked with the destiny of souls and the nature of the divine. Porphyry himself had, indeed, notably warned his readers to conceal his words as the most unutterable of secrets (ἀρρήτων ἀρρητότερα in Eus. Praep. Ev. 4.8.2 = Porph. Phil. Orac. fr. 305F Smith.) and explained how hard it is to reveal the secret meaning of the Mysteries (ἃ δὴ πάντα ἀνιχνεῦσαι καὶ ἀναπτύξαι in Porph. Antr. 4). In this paper an attempt will thus be made to investigate a specific case study – Julian’s Oration 5 – to cast light on forms of ineffability in Late Antiquity. The scope of the analysis falls within the study of Julian’s philosophical inquiry but also within the broader discussion of different forms of late antique philosophical religion, providing insights into Julian’s thought, personality and action as well as underscoring the complex but fruitful relationship between theology, philosophy and the Mysteries.
Parimal Patil, ‘Dharmakīrti, Ineffability, and Causal Relations’
Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti (c. 550-650CE) adopt an ineffability attitude which has epistemological, ontological, and semantic dimensions. By taking Dharmakīrti's views of causal relations as a model, this paper explores his arguments on the limits of (1) the ontological stance we can take to such relations, (2) our knowledge of them, and (3) our talk of them. The paper concludes with a discussion of the significance of this attitude for Dharmakīrti's meta-philosophical views.
Shaul Tor, ‘Pyrrhonian scepticism as an ineffable knack'
Any account articulating what Pyrrhonian scepticism is will rest on three conceptual pillars: (i) a subject (who is appeared to with appearances of external objects); (ii) appearances (of external objects and appearing to a subject), and (iii) external objects (correlated with appearances appearing to a subject). In this talk, I argue that Sextus subjects at least (i) and (ii) to sceptical scrutiny in a way that makes it problematic for the Pyrrhonist to help themselves to those conceptual pillars, and to any particular understanding of them, in the course of expressing an account of Pyrrhonian scepticism. I argue further, however, that this predicament turns out to be acceptable for the Pyrrhonist in the light of Sextus’ understanding of Pyrrhonism as a certain ‘ability’ (dynamis, PH 1.8), and of his attitude that loose and catachrestic use of language is appropriate for the purpose of accomplishing practical tasks.
Leonida Vanni, ‘Damascius’ Theory of Prime Matter’s Ineffability’
The notion of ineffability famously plays a central role in Neoplatonic philosophy. Many studies have investigated the Neoplatonists’ theories of an ineffable first principle; however, their speculations on prime matter, which is its counterpart at the bottom of reality, have received much less attention. In this paper, I explore the distinctive conception of an utterly ineffable prime matter that the philosopher Damascius (the last head of the Neoplatonic school in Athens) developed in his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. In particular, after 1) sketching the background of his reflections, 2) I elucidate his doctrine of prime matter and the rationale behind it; 3) finally, I set forth its (often problematic) theoretical implications.
1) Late Neoplatonists maintain that reality has a symmetrical structure; its lowest level (i.e. prime matter) derives from and corresponds to the highest one, so that it is “similar” to it, albeit “in a dissimilar way”. That is, they both escape all determination, but for opposite reasons: the highest entity brings about all properties and is, therefore, beyond them; prime matter takes on all properties and is below them. Most late Neoplatonists identify the first reality with the principle that they call “the one” (although, in fact, no name can adequately capture its nature). Accordingly, the traditional view has it that prime matter is an offspring of the one; in spite of its indeterminacy, then, matter does not completely lack some relation to unity.
2) But Damascius posits, beyond the one, a principle that transcends the one itself; he usually refers to it simply as “the ineffable”, although this entity is actually above the very notions of principle, transcendence, and ineffability. He is thus faced with a dilemma: he must reject either the notion of a correspondence between the highest and the lowest reality, or the traditional doctrine that matter relates to the one. Damascius ultimately abandons the latter: hence, matter is an offspring of the ineffable and is, accordingly, totally ineffable and not even one. In addition to structural reasons, Damascius’ theory of matter’s ineffability hinges on exegetical considerations, too: as I show, it is deeply rooted in his interpretation of some crucial passages of Plato’s Parmenides.
3) The idea that matter lacks any property – even unity – in much the same way as the ineffable principle surpasses them poses some problems:
a) it is difficult to understand how such an entity can be distinguished from absolute nothingness.
b) Positing that matter derives directly from the ineffable principle apparently jeopardises the latter’s absolute unrelatedness and transcendence. In this paper, I discuss these difficulties and some (possible) solutions.
By analysing these questions, I hope to shed light on what is, at the same time, an intriguing aspect of Damascius’ philosophy and a peculiar application of the notion of ineffability.
Stephen Walker, ‘“Talking all day is all about dào” - The adequacy of speech in Zhuāngzǐ 25’
Among the hundreds of distinct narratives, essays, and poetic interludes that have been compiled into our received Zhuāngzǐ, only a handful even suggest the idea that dào is somehow unspeakable, beyond the powers of language to pick out or characterize. The relevant passages, moreover, come down to us embedded in complex rhetorical performances by fictional characters (often personified abstractions), and it is hard to know whether the people who composed them were articulating a theory or doctrine of dào’s ineffability in the sense that philosophers today would be most comfortable analyzing. The most theoretically explicit Zhuangist text that examines whether dào is ineffable concludes that it is not—that thinking of it as somehow beyond our powers to articulate is a gross misstep in understanding it. An intriguing implication is that, when it came time to talk precisely and prosaically about dào, those responsible for the initial composition of the Zhuāngzǐ corpus were more ready to dismiss than to defend the claim of its ineffability.
Much of this presentation will be dedicated simply to explaining what happens in that text—a strikingly abstract (and strikingly neglected) dialogue that rounds off Zhuāngzǐ 25. The dialogue’s dominant speaker explains that “dào” is a deeply problematic but nonetheless useful word for referring to the totality of things. We need a word like “dào”, he argues, for talking about the various ways in which people can be urged to behave, about the various paths and patterns in the world that they can look for and respond to in their efforts to move. The problem is that, since the total range or field of such ways, paths, and patterns is indefinitely vast and complicated, calling it anything can prompt the mistaken impression that it has been defined or
delimited against whatever the chosen label excludes. The fact that we can verbally pair “dào” with “not dào”, taking them as jointly exhaustive of what there is, can make us fail to understand that there is nothing but dào.
Along with its fascinating assessment of “dào-talk” as a philosophical phenomenon, this dialogue presents a systematic challenge to any thinker who maintains that there is something inconceivable, unknowable, beyond all power to engage. The argument is that any such “something” can be understood in quotidian terms, as exactly like whatever other things a person is incompetent to understand, measure, count, and so on. The use of expressions like “immeasurable” or “unspeakable” helpfully informs us about the limits that speakers perceive to their own abilities, but supposing that they might properly characterize some mysterious or exalted entity amounts to a category mistake. The dialogue concludes that dào’sstrangeness as a
referent consists not in its being never referred to but in its being always referred to—provided, that is, that our speech reflects familiarity with the ways in which things relate to one another.